University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations

May 2017

Routine Maintenance
Joshua Waugh
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Philosophy Commons
Recommended Citation
Waugh, Joshua, "Routine Maintenance" (2017). Theses and Dissertations. 1551.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/1551

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

ROUTINE MAINTENANCE
by
Joshua Waugh

A Thesis Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in Philosophy

at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
May 2017

Abstract
Routine Maintenance
by
Joshua Waugh
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Under the Supervision of Professor Andrea Westlund

Routines are a large part of our daily lives. They are the skills that we utilize to get through
our day effortlessly. From tying our shoes to operating a vehicle, routines are repeated skilled
behaviors often initiated and produced with little attention or conscious focus. While
routines are an important part of our lives, they are neglected by much of the literature on
intentional action. This has led to some criticism that the intention literature is overintellectualized, and only focuses on behavior that has a concurrent conscious component.
Further, some authors have even suggested that skilled behaviors like routines are not
intentional whatsoever. This leads to the unfortunate conclusion that much of our daily
behavior is not controlled by the agent, but by unconscious mechanisms. In this paper I
hope to combat this view. I argue that we can understand routine behavior through a
diachronic lens, where practice can be viewed as a conscious setting of a behavioral goal.
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Routine Maintenance
Joshua Waugh
Routines are as pervasive as they are mundane. Behaviors such as tying your shoes or
operating the coffee machine are not the type of activities you pay much mind to, and yet are
necessary for getting through your day with convenience and compose most of what you do in any
given day. While many would promptly label most instances of these activities as voluntary acts,
recent works in both the empirical and philosophical literatures have attempted to undermine this
intuition. Take tying your shoes as an example, the initiation and the production of the specific
movements can be explained without reference to the agent. The initiation might just be a result of
the relevant stimuli (untied shoes) triggering an already organized behavioral response (tying the
shoes). Explanations that incorporate this rough description often label routine activities as
automatic, rote, and in many cases, involuntary. If routines do encompass a great deal of our daily
activities, then such an explanation of routines would diminish the category of behaviors an agent
can have control over. This clashes with the strong intuition that routines are activities that we do
have control over in respect to their initiation and production and would severely limit the kinds of
behavior any theory of agency could adequately account for. If routines are explained purely through
non-conscious, lower level mechanisms then this would make many standard accounts of agency
explanatorily weak and disconnected from how we actually conduct ourselves.
This paper provides an explanatory framework for routines that allows for standard agential
mechanisms of control like intention, higher-order goals, and deliberation to be diachronic factors in
the initiation and production of routine behaviors. I will argue that by focusing on the creation of
routines through practice, we can provide a diachronic explanation for routines that is not only
agent centered but also captures the features that make routines unique. In Section 1 I will argue
that the empirical evidence has led many to favor frameworks for routines that are too focused on
1

the immediate causes of behavior. This “synchronic viewpoint” unfairly limits the kind of
explanation we can give for routines such that only the neurophyscial factors are treated as relevant
causes. I believe that there is an explanatory framework that provides a historical account of routines
that does constitutively involve the agent. In Section 2 I argue that practice is such an account for
routines. Practice not only provides a framework for routines as agential, but also accounts for their
automatic nature. In Section 3 I will elucidate the practice element and draw a direct connection
between practice and agency. Finally, in Section 4 I will briefly consider some objections.

Section 1 – Routines as Automatic

1.1: The Difficulty with Routines

Routines are a type of skilled behavior. Skills are patterns of learned behavior that are
initiated and produced in a fast and efficient manner. Routines as a type of skill can be characterized
as the mundane skills we perform on a daily basis that occur within a short time span.1 Examples of
routines include operating a manual gearbox, locking your front door, whisking eggs, performing a
push up, entering a password on your phone, peeling a banana, tying your shoes etc. They differ
from other expert skills, like playing NBA level basketball, because routines are contained in terms
of their environmental goals. The work on expertise, and especially the work on “flow” as it pertains
to experts, have informed a lot of the present discussion and understanding of the relationship
between automaticity and agency. However, there are stark differences between the study of routines
and expert skills. For one, expert skills are often placed inside of an agent’s explicit reasoning. To
play and practice basketball at the level of an expert requires advance organization and planning,
1

The definition of routines presented is partially indebted to Joëlle Proust (Proust 2015, 724).
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features unseen in routines. Further, expert skills also fit explicitly within an agent’s value structure.
Being expertly skilled at something requires that the agent value the time she puts into the practice.
Again, this is not the case with routines.
Perhaps the most interesting difference between routines and expert skilled behavior is the
requirement of the amount attention needed to successfully complete the given behavior. For expert
skills, agency is often identified with the intense focus and attention needed. This attention is under
some kind of cognitive control, where prior conscious goal setting influences that intention. For
routines, however, this kind of attention is often lacking. The nature of routines is almost that we do
not pay attention to them. Their mundane nature forces them out of our conscious interest. We can
hold a conversation while tying our shoes, but we cannot play NBA level basketball and have a
conversation. I will belabor this point throughout this paper, and the reason why is because most of
the work dedicated to resolving the amount antimony between agency and the automatic is
overwhelming focused on expert skilled behavior and not routines. There is a gap in the literature
that must be resolved.
As such, routines have two defining features: First, routines are not reliant on awareness or
on focused attention2 in terms of their activation or production. We do not deliberate much (if at all)
before tying our shoes, and we often do not think about the movements as they are being produced
(consciously thinking about skilled movements while they are being produced diminishes
performance). Second, the movements of a given routine will be similar across all instances of their
performance. Tying our shoes involves the repetition of a set of movements in every instance of that

Attention and awareness can be considered technical terms, and my usage here deviates from the standard usage. The
way I am using attention corresponds to a distinction given by Anne Treisman (2009) between focused attention,
inattention, and divided attention. This distinction can be roughly captured by instances where a teacher yells at a pupil
“pay attention!” Similarly, conscious awareness can be thought of quite generally. I do not deny that we are often
conscious of routines being produced, but that routines are often not the locus of that awareness (and more generally,
our concern). Similarly, lower level mechanisms of control are always utilizing attention, but focused attention concerns
what the agent is currently attending to.
2
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routine. While there will be mechanical differences from instance to instance, there will still be an
identifiable pattern associated with every routine.3
These two features of routines make them incompatible with a common characterization of
intentional acts as consciously monitored behaviors initiated by some kind of deliberative process (as
espoused by Bargh et al. 2001; Haggard 2005; Libet 1999; Wegner 2003). The thought here is that
most of the language and examples in the intention literature involves idealized instances of forming
an intention, and is often presented as a deliberative procedure involving a conscious weighing
between different options and possibilities. While the authors cited are hostile toward standard
theories of intention, is not an uncommonly recognized problem within the intention literature itself
that many of the examples and language surrounding intentions is too cognitive. The worry is that if
intentions are too idealized, then it will not capture much of our behavior. Routines are activities
that do not require any deliberation to be activated, and very rarely does anyone go through the
conscious process of forming an intention to perform a routine. The normal experience of a routine
like tying our shoes is just that we see our shoes untied and then proceed to tie our shoes. As we
shall see later in the paper, the empirical evidence suggests that even the conscious awareness of this
process is more peripheral than fundamental.
The intuition behind these thoughts is nicely captured by David Velleman (2015, 330), who
asks his readers to think about what goes through their minds when they are getting out of a chair:
“If I may generalize from my own experience (to echo James), you will find that if you had any
thought at all of getting up, it was more a speculation about getting up than a decision to do so.
Then suddenly you were getting up.” Normal experience of routines is a lot like this: there is usually
no prior deliberation, no prior decision to act before their activation and we do not pay close

I do not want to argue that routines form a natural class of distinct behaviors. The primary examples of routines set
them apart, but there will be borderline cases. For example, posture fits the characterization but the behavior is extended
temporally beyond any of the given routines and requires continuous tracking throughout the day.
3
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enough attention to be consciously guiding the ensuing movements. Sometimes, behvior seems to
just happen, and we are only aware of the effects.
Even if we don’t take the above characterization at face value, routines are hard to pin down
as agential in more nuanced theories. A more promising route, following Bratman, would argue that
routines are agential in virtue of a higher order plan or policy. 4 Bratman argues that we can
understand behaviors that are not initiated with concurrent deliberating through the larger context
of planning. I may not deliberate where I am going to lunch, but nonetheless it may be an
intentional act considering my overall commitments. For example, if I decide to get a salad for
lunch, that can be understood through my prior commitment of sticking to a diet plan. Planning a
road trip, or having the general policy of only driving a manual car, would necessitate initiating and
producing the routine of operating a manual gearbox. In other words, we can make sense of the
behavior involved in shifting with a manual gearbox when placed in the proper context; the
seemingly automatic routine behavior is thus intentional within the wider context of planning a road
trip.
This route is unsatisfying, as it only circumvents the two defining features of routines.
Routines are initiated and produced independent of any particular goal and may even be irrespective
of any general policy. Tying your shoes is often not bound to any particular plan, or very rarely
would anyone have the explicit policy of tying their shoes when their shoes are untied.5 Further, it
makes little sense to say that anyone has an explicit policy to tie their shoes in contexts listed by a
series of descriptive conditions. The origin of the higher order plan or policy could, and often does,
Routines themselves cannot be plans, as Bratman requires that plans are both the result of prior deliberation and openended (Bratman 1987, 29). This almost directly contradicts the two defining features of routines. It is more complicated
to ask if routines are policies. The most straightforward answer I could give is that policies as defined by Bratman are
too broad of a category for routines. For example, the policy of being kind to strangers requires much more than any
routine could capture.
5 One could suggest that the policy of being “well maintained in appearance” or some other general policy would capture
the routine of tying one’s shoes. I think the problem remains the same. These kinds of policies would be so general that
they can capture many kinds of routines without the need of specifying any specific pattern of behavior. What we want
is to explain that pattern in terms of the agent.
4
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have its own explanation that is independent from the explanation of the origin of the routine. Rote
practice may have more to do with tying our shoes then the values, plans, and policies agents have
surrounding that behavior. I will argue that my framework not only explains how routines are
agential, but also gives an account of how the specific movements involved in the routine can be
explained in reference to the agent. Under this framework, the agent is not merely utilizing her
routines but can actively dictate the when the routine is activated and the specific movements
involved in their production.
This more promising route still fails to adequately account for routines as agent centered
activities. Routines are difficult to place in any theory of agency because of their common features.
Yet, we should strive to find a way to explain how routines can be agential for two reasons. The first
is just the fact that most people feel that their daily activity is not only set by them, but also that they
do have a say in both initiating and producing routine behaviors. Second, we can imagine a case
where a soldier performs a reflexive act that would be considered routine in wartime, but actually
causes harm in a current civilian context. It is immediately unclear what kind of relationship the
agent has to the behavior if we cannot incorporate such a routine into a theory of agency. This
applies both to assessing moral blame or exculpation in this case. Routines not only play a large part
in our daily lives, but they can also be central to certain cases of moral responsibility.
The question then remains: what does cause routine behavior? More often than not, those
influenced by the empirical literature do not point to the agent. In the following sub-sections I will
review some of the evidence suggesting that because routines are automatized, they are thus
involuntary. The effect of taking this evidence as explanatorily primary for routines is to adopt a
“synchronic viewpoint” or the view that the only relevant explanation for the initiation and
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production of behavior are the immediate factors that take place just before the behavior occurs.6
This viewpoint is flawed, and I will show that routine behaviors can have a diachronic explanation
that relies on the element of practice. Ultimately, I hope to show that by thinking of practice as a
diachronic element, we can explain routines not only with respect to intentions but also to the agent.

1.2: Routines as Automatic, Involuntary, and Rote

A wide range of behaviors varying in degrees of complexity can be labeled as automatic. The
marker of automaticity is reserved for reflexive behaviors that are produced involuntarily. 7 A
myoclonic jerk caused by a doctor’s hammer is involuntary and automatic. The more contentious
issue is whether most instances of routine skilled behaviors are automatic in this way; as routines are
many more times complex than simple reflexes. The two defining features of routines, that they are
not reliant on conscious attention or awareness and that they are similar across all instances of their
activation, gives us reasons to think that they are automatic. For example, here is a rather standard
definition of automatic behavior: “Automatic processes are characterized as fast, effortless, (from a
standpoint of allocation of cognitive resources), and unitized (or proceduralized)…” (Ackerman
1987, 4). Routines are usually activated in very particular contexts or in the presence of discrete
stimuli, and the ensuing movements are almost exact repetitions from previous instances of the
behavior. Thus they are fast, effortless, and unitized. You might believe that the more general
outline of the same input (hammer) yielding the same output (jerk) holds in a lot of cases of routine
behaviors. In this section, I will provide some evidence for this claim.
You can see this point reflected in the characterization of intention above. If you require that all intentional behavior
stem from a conscious decision, then it is easy to point out that no such conscious decision took place right before the
behavior was produced. Mele (2009) provides a good critique of this characterization.
7 I do not want to state strongly that all concepts of automaticity in behavior denote involuntary reflexes. But, I do think
that the common definition of automatic behavior involves involuntary movements. My argument could ultimately fit
with a less restrictive concept of automatic behavior.
6
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Routines fit the definition of automatic behavior. The problem here is that automatic
behaviors are often described as involuntary and rote. If routine skills are automatic in nature, then
many see that as precluding the possibility of an agent setting her routine behavior. What reasons do
we have to think this? Two preliminaries appear frequently in the empirical literature. (1) Routines
are often featured in cases where habituated behaviors undermine conscious intentions, otherwise
known as double-capture error cases (Humphreys et al. 2003).8 A common example is one where an
agent forms an intention to drive to the store on the way home from work, but she finds herself
taking the familiar route home instead of the route to the store. The habit to follow the same route
home everyday ends up defeating the created intention. Because the activation of routines do not
need conscious attention, they have the quality of interfering with deliberated upon intentions
because they can be initiated without the agent’s conscious consent. Many argue that this shows that
some habits or routines are non-voluntary acts that we must fight against to produce intended acts
(Ibid 202-206; Hommel 2007; Ouellette et al. 1998, 57). (2) Patients with significant frontal lobe
damage often display utilization behavior, which is the initiation and production of routine or skilled
behavior in inappropriate contexts (Ghika et al. 1995, Milner et al. 1984) For example, a patient
presented with a toothbrush will start brushing her teeth despite the fact that she is in an
examination room. In these cases, the patient does not have any conscious awareness that she is
performing these behaviors and yet the produced behavior is produced without any performance
errors (despite the inappropriate context). The common conclusion drawn is that all skilled behavior
is produced without the need for conscious awareness, and what the pathological cases indicate are
cases where the agent lacks the ability to inhibit the behavior.

The word “habituated” in this instance is a technical term referring to behaviors that are automatized. For clarification,
I do not think that routines are habits. For one, habits sometimes have an explicit moral dimension that just is not
present in many cases of routine behavior. Second, habits encompass a larger class of behaviors. For example, one could
have the habit of going to the gym every weekday. This habit would contain multiple routines, but it could not be a
routine itself under my definition.
8
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Behaviors produced through double-capture errors (1) and pathological cases like utilization
behavior (2) can be the basis for a stronger view about routines (and skills in general).9 Routines, as
behaviors with environment-driven goals, can be activated non-consciously and the guidance of the
produced behavior are best explained through unconscious mechanisms of control (Bargh 2001,
1015). This description is not only applied to “outlier” cases, like slips or utilization behavior.
Rather, the automatic initiation and production of routine behavior just is the norm. Any conscious
or deliberative act initiating a routine would be the outlier. Support for this position appears all over
in the empirical literature. Libet’s timing experiments, for example, purportedly show that the feeling
of intention occurs after the decision to act has been made as represented by a build of neuronal
activity known as the readiness potential (Libet 1999).10 These timing experiments also provide a
broad basis for theorists who claim that the “sense of agency” we have is actually just a post-hoc
reconstruction created after the behavior has already been produced; even if we felt like we intended
a certain act, it could just be an after-effect (Haggard et al. 2006). Skilled behavior is shown to be
activated by non-declarative memory systems that are decidedly separated from semantic
representations, and thus separated from a system that is more closely associated with deliberative
reasoning and intentions (Reber 1996; Reber et al. 1994). 11 Further, skilled behaviors are often
compared to “fixed action patterns” that are gained through rote or procedural learning (Graybiel
2008). These action patterns are pre-set organized behaviors that are activated independent of the
agent and can be thought of as reflexes.

While this is not the only route in which people can arrive at the conclusion that routines are automatic, it is a popular
one. (See: Jeannerod 1994; Marcel 2003)
10 See (Lau et al. 2007) for an updated run of these timing experiments.
11 This also connects to a common claim that routines and other skilled behaviors are hard to categorize as intentional
because the movements of these behaviors are difficult to capture in language. In other words, people struggle with
describing the specific movements of skilled actions. If you think that intentions are propositions, then you would have a
hard time containing a given skilled behavior in a proposition. Luthra (2015, 2274-2275) provides a very lucid account of
this objection.
9
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The seemingly automatic nature of routines make them a hard case for agency. Their
repetitive nature and independence from focused attention make them apt to be described as
automatic, rote, and involuntary. This description is backed up by a significant amount of empirical
data, where the above is only a brief overview of a vast field. My aim in this paper is not to dispute
any particular empirical experiment, but rather to question if the empirical experiments reveal the
correct framework to analyze routines as either agential or non-agential.12 We could treat the matter
as settled by this evidence, and many actually do, but we should question what kind framework this
leaves us for analyzing behavior and further question if it is fair to any given theory of agency. In the
next couple sections, I provide reasons for rejecting the idea that the empirical evidence as outlined
give us a sufficient reason to accept routines as involuntary and non-agential.

1.3: The Synchronic Viewpoint

The power of the Libet timing experiments is in their details. In them, subjects are often
instructed to move by flexing their wrist or moving their finger and then to report when they were
aware of any “feeling” to move. The report of this awareness occurs 350-450ms after the readiness
potential. This readiness potential is a build up of neuronal activity that is often taken to be a reliable
indicator of a “decision” to act (Libet 1999, 49-52). This decision is to be understood as not
involving the agent, but constituted by neural systems. These experiments have informed recent
work on the “sense of agency” literature. A basic question this literature attempts to answer is this:
how do we come to feel as if we have ownership over our behavior? A popular answer to this
question is that the motor system computes the potential sensory consequences of a goal-oriented
behavior and compares that “prediction” to the actual sensory consequences of the produced
There are already some critical examinations of Libet’s work that do a good job of calling into question the method
and results of his timing experiments (See: Herdova 2016; Mele 2009; Schurger et al. 2012)
12
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behavior. If the prediction aligns with the actual sensory consequences, then the agent gains a
feeling of intentionality. If the prediction does not align, then the agent feels as if the movements
were caused involuntarily (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007; Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004). Both the Libet
timing experiments and the work done on the sense of agency have led many to conclude that
intentionality in skilled behavior is just an after-effect. The real of cause of action is not the agent,
but underlying neural mechanisms that initiate and guide behavior.
The relationship between these two works is an implicit (if not explicit) endorsement of a
kind of explanatory framework. This is the synchronic viewpoint, and as explanatory framework it
favors immediate factors over any diachronic factors when explaining behavior (especially skilled
behaviors like routines). If you produce a certain behavior, then the proper temporal time frame to
examine and explain that behavior corresponds to the time frame of the neural activity that
immediately precedes that behavior. The notion that routines are initiated and guided by
unconscious mechanisms points to such a framework, as all of these mechanisms either occur right
before the behavior takes place or are occurrent during the production.13
This synchronic viewpoint thus constricts the relevant explanations for skilled behavior such
that it pushes out standard agential factors practically by definition. It is hard to see how any theory
of agency that incorporates diachronic factors can possibly cohere with the empirical evidence under
this time frame. In fact, adopting the synchronic viewpoint makes it hard to explain any behavior in
terms of the agent. This is partially why it has become increasingly popular to adopt a kind of
“divided mind” view. For example, Daniel Wegner splits the individual into an illusory self and the
actual, non-conscious mind (Wegner 2003, 268-270). The illusory self is the narrative driven self that
The emphasis on the proximate causes can also be seen in some works on skilled agency. It has become increasingly
popular to solve the problem of skilled agency by appealing to attentional mechanisms (Wu, 2016). For example, one
solution proposes that during a skilled activity an agent can shift her attention toward relevant stimuli that will activate
the desired behavioral set (where this is understood as the series of behavior that is associated with that specific
stimulus). (See Fridland 2014, and Christensen et al. 2016 for examples) The problem is that such a solution is an
attempt to explain how some proximal causes can be agential. The problem is that coordination and strategy really only
work for “expert” skills. Routines are more susceptible to being explained solely through unconscious mechanisms.
13
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rationalizes behavior under the guise of the plan, but in reality there is a hidden and unconscious self
that is the actually cause of all of our behaviors.14 This line of thought is an extreme example of
taking the synchronic viewpoint too far and reaching the conclusion that no agential factors could
possibly be reconciled with the empirical work. If we do divide the mind into two parts, it becomes
easier to dismiss theories of intention like Bratman’s as pertaining only to over-intellectualized
accounts of the self. There might be a deliberating self that sets global goals, but it would have little
effect on large swaths of behaviors like routines.
If we want to extend a historical or diachronic framework down to more seemingly rote
behaviors like routines, then we cannot analyze routines in a limited temporal time span. Bratman
and others can give a good account of how plans affect future behaviors by treating intentions as
historical elements. The guise of a plan like “going to Thailand” does directs future conduct toward
that plan. There is already an obvious path for explaining routines in a diachronic sense. Routines
are learned patterns of behavior, which means that their creation is something we can analyze beyond
the innate or extremely rigid reflexes like a myoclonic jerk. What I will argue in the next section is
that we should also specify a practice element for routines to capture the two features mentioned
earlier: (a) initiation without awareness or attention and (b) similarity of produced movements.

Section 2 – Towards A New Framework

2.1: Practice as History

Bratman argues that plans or intentions influence future behavior in two ways: (1) that plans
cut off future practical reasoning about what to do, and (2) planning is conduct controlling in the
Pop-psychology also plays along, often telling the readers that there is a “hidden” and “disguised” mind that thwarts
your better conscious intentions to change (O’Connor 2015; Wilson 2014).
14
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relevant context (Bratman 1987, 16-17). For example, deciding to go to the store on Tuesday (1)
cuts off other possibilities (i.e. the agent resists reconsideration when the time comes) and (2) the
behavior facilitating the agent going to the store is intelligible because of the plan in place. Routines
partly follow this line. They are often initiated without reconsideration, and without explicit
deliberation. Further, as the context arises, the movements for a given routine are activated. In other
words, tying your shoes does not allow for much reconsideration and the conditions for when to tie
your shoes are “set” in advance. The problem is that routines are not plans (see Section 1.1). Merely
deciding to make a set of movements routine or habitual is not enough to secure the two elements
of routines. In other words, the creation of a routine is not determined by a decision alone.
However, I will argue that practice can provide an explanatory framework that is not only diachronic
but also encompasses Bratman’s planning conditions in regards to routines.
Plans provide a historical element for the intermediate steps needed to fulfill that plan. 15
Routines cannot have the same kind of historical element because of their stringent conditions.
Nonetheless, I assert that “practice” broadly construed can provide such an element for routines.
This comes packed in with what practice amounts to: that practice is the repeated production of
specific movements in certain contexts with the aim of making those movements automatic. While
one cannot merely “plan” to tie a half-Windsor knot whenever needed, practicing tying a halfWindsor knot will make sure that the relevant behavior occurs in the relevant context. This captures
a significant aspect of routines that most theories of intention lack. Tying a knot is almost fully
identified by the specific and successful movements of that routine. Practice grounds the
mechanistic reproduction of those movements across all instances of the routine. We practice so

Beyond Bratman, I was also partly motivated by Mele’s Springs of Action. In this work, Mele argues that intentions
provide a historical framework for explaining produced behaviors. He argues that if the intention was absent in certain
cases, then the kind of explanation used to explain the given behavior would be very different (Mele 1992, 40-41).
15

13

that those movements become automatized. Planning to tie a knot is one thing, but practicing those
movements fulfills what it is to come to have a routine for tying a tie.
Practice also explains the unconscious mechanisms that lead to the proximal activation of
that particular behavioral set. In other words, the context and the initiation and production of the
particular movements can still be explained proximally through the use of unconscious mechanisms,
but the historical element of practice provides an explanatorily primary way of understanding why
that behavior occurred at all. This not only incorporates the diachronic elements, but is also
consistent with the empirical literature as well. Practice connects up to the agent because we do need
to set aside time and effort to actually practice, or more simply, we are aware of what we are doing
when we practice those movements. Even if a routine is activated unconsciously, the behavioral set
has to be explained in reference to the practice for that routine. In the next section, I will flesh out
some of the specifics of this view.

Section 3 - Agency in Practice

3.1: Organized and Goal Directed

While I have stated that practice is the historical element that explains routines with respect
to the agent, there is still the matter of specifying how practice actually operates as a capacity of
agency. Routines have special characteristics, namely that they can be produced without focused
attention and that each instance of a given routine displays similar movements. Practice has a
twofold job. It must explain these characteristics and explain them in a way that connects them to
the agent. As such, there are two aspects of practice to consider: (1) practice organizes behavior to

14

not only respond to certain environmental stimuli but also sequences that behavior so that (2) the
behavior is directed toward an agent specified goal.
Practice functions to make a certain behavioral pattern concrete. That is to say, when an
agent practices a series of movements it is so that those movements can be repeated with increased
speed and accuracy at a later date. When we first learn how to tie a tie, our movements are clunky
and we have to rely on conscious guidance to actually produce the behavior. Over time, the
movements become easier to produce. An important feature of this practice is not just gaining
speed, but also organizing that behavior in a certain sequence. Tying a tie successfully very much
depends on the order of the movements. The idea that patterns of behavior are stored in a memory
system is not new. Motor schemas are often evoked to explain how patterns of behavior are
produced under set conditions (Jeannerod 1997, 128). These schemas are often thought of as motor
plans that guide behavior when the relevant context emerges. Practice is one way that a schema can
be created, and a schema can store the specific movements that a given routine is identified by
(Jeannerod 1997, 119-125; Schmidt 1975, 235).
Merely mentioning schemas as a basis for routines is not enough. The key idea is in how
practice creates a motor schema. The sequence of movements in tying a tie is in service of the goal
of tying a tie. I see this as a rather intermediate goal, distinct from both the higher order reason that
compels you to learn how to tie a tie (like going to your first wedding) and the lower order control
mechanics (the kinematics of your hand when grasping the tie). The distinct nature of intermediate
goals concerns both the function of the object and the sequence of behavior necessary to realize that
function. There are only so many ways to successfully tie a tie, and thus only so many ways to
organize behavior to realize that intermediate goal. The point is that the intermediate goal and the
created schema cannot be separated such that you can only analyze the behavior without mention of

15

the goal. This point is reflected in a lot of the literature on motor skill learning (Jeannerod 1997, 126127; Willingham 1998, 565–566)
The interesting thing about much of the empirical literature concerning the unconscious
activation of skillful behavior is that it focuses on the automatic and unconscious pursuit of goals. That
is, goals activated by environmental stimuli and the pursuit of which is controlled by unconscious
mechanisms. Part of what I am pushing in this paper is to focus on the creation of goals. Specifically,
the creation of routine goals. The separation of the two is important, especially when it is often
stated that the unconscious pursuit of goals is a signpost for involuntary actions. The empirical
evidence might point to this unconscious pursuit being ubiquitous for skillful behavior, but it is far
from clear what the unconscious creation of goals would look like. Explanations in terms of implicit
learning or procedural learning have certain limits, as only very basic sequences can actually be
learned in a completely rote manner (Logan 1985, 369-372). Further, conscious attention during the
practice phase of any skill greatly increases the rate in which the skill is learned and how well it is
performed (Ericsson et al. 1993, 367-369).16 Goal creation in this case will be the key component of
agency, where practice is the primary means for achieving that goal in every instance in which it is
activated.
Practice creates schemas such that behavior is organized around a particular goal. Intuitively,
practice is agent initiated. We need to find time to practice the movements and so forth. Further, the
agent herself explicitly recognizes what the intermediate goals are and the correct sequence needed
to accomplish that goal. It is not just that we practice how to tie a tie, but we specifically learn the
movements of how to tie a Half-Windsor knot. The agent has a lot of control over how her practice
is conducted. These points are reflected in the literature on “knowledge of results”. Knowledge of
There is a question about learning in a developmental context, where learning occurs and yet may be more implicit
than learning as it occurs in our adult lives. I have little to say about this context, but there are certain questions that
would need to be answered. First, it is unclear the extent that children learn only through rote practice. Second, it is
unclear when children become agents. Finally, rational capacities can supersede and create new routines.
16
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results is the incorporation of feedback in practice, and is a factor in creating or modulating schemas
(Jeannerod 1997, 122). The referred to feedback is usually some kind of error detection. Error
detection can only make sense with some concrete goal in mind, and for successful routine practice
that goal must be agent directed. Gracefully executed movements mean very little if the proper
sequence is not adhered to. The interesting thing about knowledge of results is that the
“incorporation” of feedback usually comes in the form of conscious strategies (Willingham 1998,
567). For example, recent literature on knowledge of results focuses on the use of mental simulation
by subjects (Jeannerod 1997, 119-121). It has been shown the practice improves if subjects imagine
themselves performing the skilled behavior repeatedly. The employment of conscious strategies in
this case refers to making alterations in future planned movements by imagining how the practice
ought to go. Thus, the agent consciously simulates the desired action, and then practices to achieve
some mirror of that simulation.
While my claims in this paper are mainly theoretical rather than empirical, I do want to note
that the empirical literature has not decided the matter of routines as agential. Work on schemas and
other areas do point to a compelling diachronic framework for analyzing routine behaviors. Once
we recognize that the agent can be involved in the practice that structures the diachronic framework
of routines, then we cannot so easily dismiss routine behavior as involuntary and non-agential.
To close, we can see that even in the empirical realm there is doubt surrounding the idea that
the proper viewpoint in explaining action is synchronic. In response to the Libet experiments, and
the conclusion drawn that decisions to act were made before the subject even experienced the
feeling of intending, Raymond Tallis (2011) said of the relatively small action the subjects were
required to perform:
Over the months, you have carried out a vast number of voluntary actions so that
you might be able when required to perform an action that you could not carry out
entirely voluntarily. Many of these preparatory actions have taken the form of
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positioning yourself to have experience and acquire knowledge, deploying many
intermediate steps in doing so. (254)
This response is motivated by the fact that Libet’s experiment only concerned itself with moving
one’s finger, a relatively small and simple movement taken out of a larger and more interesting
context by the experimenters. In a similar fashion, Bernard Hommel (2009) notes that:
Once they enter a lab, however, they are commonly talked into responding to
arbitrary stimuli by carrying out meaningless movements…And yet, most models of
action control seem to take this highly artificial stimulus-response situation so serious
that they use it as a template for voluntary action in general. (512)

Again, there are reasons to be suspicious of this view of action that only pertains to very minute if
not arbitrary actions in a synchronic time frame. Substantial conclusions about the role of intention
and how much control we have over our actions are drawn from this small time frame, and there are
serious reasons to be concerned. What we do and how we ought not be solely explained either be
introspective evidence concerning what you were thinking just before an action nor can it be fully
captured by looking at small movements in a lab that is only concerned with a few milliseconds of
activity.

3.2: Agency in the Automatic
The overview of practice that supports the diachronic attribution of agency in routines
fleshes out an important point of this paper. The agent can set the specific movements involved in a
routine, whether that involves conscious deliberation or intentional planning. The idea is that
practice primes certain movements to become routine under the guise of standard philosophical
notions of agency. This allows us to expand the notion of automaticity to include aspects of agency,
and not just refer to reflexive movements. The agent practices a set of movements so that they can
be initiated and produced with ease. Everyone recognizes that tying our shoes by consciously
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guiding each movement would be time consuming. Practicing, and thus memorizing, the correct
patterns allows us to tie our shoes with little mental effort and little disruption.
This allows us to take on certain cases of responsibility in a new light. Imagine a case where
an individual who has received extensive military training causes harm to another individual because
that training “kicked in” at the wrong moment or in the wrong context. It would be hard to
condone or forgive the behavior under a synchronic view of skilled behavior, as we would have to
parse out the behavior as non-agential. With the diachronic view in mind, however, we can give a
fuller explanation in terms of the agent’s history. This has important implications for imparting
responsible depending on the specifics of the case.
For example, we can imagine a case where a soldier was forced to commit to combat training
and is now having a hard time adjusting to civilian life. If we take the standard Aristotelian account
of coercion on its face, that coerced acts are involuntary in terms of moral responsibility, then it is
plausible that the history presents some mitigating factors for imparting moral responsibility for this
former soldier. This is a tough case, and I do not wish to present an obvious solution. What I do
want to argue is that we can more aptly reason about this case by keeping the diachronic history as
primary. This also becomes apparent if we think about certain prescriptive judgments concerning
what a former soldier ought to do when no longer fighting. Words like “adjust” signals the fact that
an individual must learn how not to activate those routines in a context that is clearly inappropriate
for those routines. The automatization must be overridden, contained, or altogether destroyed. We
can only explain these steps forward in terms of agency if we take the diachronic path and take
practice as a power of the agent.
Less serious cases of responsibility also fall out of my framework. Learning how to drive a
manual effectively is both necessary for keeping yourself safe as well as others. We can rightfully
criticize someone driving on the freeway if they cannot operate the clutch very well. My account
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does not even have to be applied to moral responsibility at all, as it seem likely that at one point
most everyone has been criticized for not learning how to do something as if it was a routine. For
example, a person who has to look up the instructions for using the coffee machine might just be
subject to criticism if they use it daily. Factors of convenience, saving time, focus, etc. can all be
evaluated more effectively if we do not always have to explain actions within a synchronic time
frame.

Section 4 – Objections/Worries
There are two objections to my account that I would like to briefly consider. (1) That this
diachronic account of the attribution of agency muddles what we can say about pathological cases.
(2) Double-capture error cases are still problematic.

4.1: Pathological Cases

In section 1.1 I presented the case of UB patients, who automatically initiated certain routine
behaviors in inappropriate contexts without any conscious awareness of what they were doing. This
is a concern because if we take the diachronic picture, then these instances of routine behavior are
agential in some sense because they have the relevant history. This is problematic because we do not
want obvious cases of pathology to count as agent controlled behavior.
Two things are worth considering. First, the creation of the routine by the agent still holds.
In other words, patients with frontal lobe damage do not do routines they have not created. I
highlight this because it is important to note that the pathology involved with UB centers on the
synchronic control of already learned behaviors. Thus, there is good reason to say that these
behaviors are partially agential. They are not pre-determined in the same way a myoclonic jerk is, nor
20

are they completely random motions of the body. There is a sense in which the patterns of
behaviors activated are successful.
Second, I have not presented a full account of what it is to be an agent. What I have argued
for is that certain patterns of behavior can be considered agential if we take into account their
diachronic history. This does not preclude the possibility that there are other conditions that would
prevent the patterned behavior from being non-agential. If these cases truly show that the patients
are unable to inhibit their behaviors, it is unclear that these patients are actually fully operational
agents. Part of being an agent might be having the power to inhibit a certain routine at a certain
time, if she is aware of the routine going awry.17

4.2: Slips

This leads into the second concern, there still seems to be the problem of “slips” where
habituated routines undermine other intentions. Under my account, these routines are still agential
even if they defeat consciously set intentions (like going to the store on the way home from work).
My answer hangs on a slight twist of my answer to the previous problem.
Imagine that someone pointed out to you that your form when doing a push-up was actually
harmful to your shoulders. After learning the correct form, you are now tasked with modifying or
outright replacing the old routine. A requirement on any modification of the old routine would be to
pay attention to your movements such that you can be sure that you are correctly implementing the
new form. If you happen to do a set of push-ups where you used the old and harmful form, it would

Having the power to inhibit is much more vague than having the wherewithal to inhibit. However, I must go with the
more vague terminology. If I agreed that a condition on being an agent is to have the wherewithal to inhibit behavior
then I would have to concede that all double-capture error cases are non-agential. But, having the power to inhibit
merely implies that it is possible for the agent to inhibit the behavior if she was aware of it. UB patients do not even have
this luxury.
17
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be appropriate to chastise yourself for not paying enough attention to what you were doing. Thus, it
seems like we can blame the agent in certain situations for failing to pay close enough attention to
their bodily movements when it is clear that the situation demands the alteration of a routine. The
point is not that the bad habit is non-agential, but that the activation of the routine was a failure to
inhibit by the agent.

Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that certain mundane behaviors that appear to be automatic when
looking at their proximate causes can be accounted for under the umbrella of conscious agency if a
diachronic framework is utilized. Doing so allows us to better explain how agents actually functions,
as routines appear to constitute a good majority of our daily activities. Losing the ability to explain
such routines as agential would make most of what we do mechanistic. Aspects of personality and
responsibility would be lost, or harder to explain in traditional intentional terms. Even if routines
represent the mundane, they are still worth preserving as agential.
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